20200515 Staatstrojaner für den Verfassungsschutz?

15.05.2020 Staatstrojaner für den Verfassungsschutz?

Front door or back door?

The state Trojan has been with us for a few years now, for 2 years it has been legal on a smartphone. This involves software being placed on the device to be monitored and the communication can be read at the "source", i.e. before encryption. The "source telecommunication surveillance" ("Quellen-TKÜ") has so far been allowed to be used by customs and police when criminal offences are involved.

The Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Verfassungsschutz) would also like to have this "right", soon also at the federal level with a law on the "Harmonisation of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution". Some federal states have already pushed ahead and defined such powers in their own states. Already the access by the police is highly dangerous, because via the state Trojan - but beyond what is permitted - writing access is also possible and thus "evidence" can be falsified or generated. This is even more to be feared by a secret service!

In the present state laws or their drafts, the state Trojan is now supposed to be allowed even in the case of "dangers" - who defines these?

On the EU level there is also a fierce dispute about how to get hold of encrypted communication. While the German position advocates the back door by means of source TCTÜ, the Brussels anti-terrorism coordinator Gilles de Kerchove wants even more powers than surveillance through the Trojan back door. As Telepolis reports, with reference to the Investigatory Powers Act of 2016, the Australian Telecommunications Assistance and Access Bill of 2018 and Access Bill of 2018 and the non-partisan American plans for an EARN IT Act he is calling for an EU regulation that would give interested parties on the state side a right to access encrypted chat information through the front door.

This means nothing other than that the providers would have to have a duplicate key for all user keys, which would be given to government agencies upon request. We have often warned of this dangerous nonsense in connection with cybercrime. It would only be a matter of time before these master keys would fall into the hands of criminals.